essay was published in the July-September issue of The Dublin Magazine and is a review of Poems by Beckett's close friend Thomas McGreevy. Despite its brevity, 'Humanistic Quietism' remains a stubbornly opaque text in which Beckett wilfully frustrates his reader with a dense barrage of obscure references, difficult syntax and a lack of clarity about his aesthetic allegiances. And not only is this short text replete with religious imagery, it emerges from the difference in religious temperament between McGreevy -an outspoken Catholic, particularly in matters of aestheticsand Beckett, a 'dirty low-church P[rotestant] even in poetry' albeit one who lacked 'the least faculty or disposition for the supernatural' (Beckett, 2009b, 134, 257) .
Although a number of critics have discussed the review in previous studies, there are still several knots that remain to be untied. In particular, I argue that Seán Kennedy's reading (2005) of the review does not significantly appreciate Beckett's religious ambivalence, and ends up casting him as antagonistic towards Catholicism and therefore surreptitiously critical of McGreevy's poetics. I will propose that Beckett's conflicted attitude towards Christianity -including Catholicism -makes matters more complex.
Humanism vs. Quietism
The difficulties with this text begin with the title, which seems, as Chris Ackerley points out, 'oxymoronic' (2000, 88) . It is difficult to see how 'humanism' could have anything to do with the obscure and almost forgotten heresy of 'quietism' which spread through Spain, Italy, and France in the late seventeenth century. Whereas humanism rests on the belief that the human species is capable of steady improvement in the spheres of morality, material conditions and knowledge, quietism encourages human beings to recognise their worthlessness, impotence, and ignorance, and to submit humbly before God. Moreover, while Beckett had a sustained interest in quietism during the 1930s (Ackerley, 2000; Feldman, 2009; Nixon, 2011, chap. 3), he seems to have had little patience for anything involving humanism. In September 1934, shortly after submitting the review, Beckett told McGreevy that the 'deanthropomorphizations of the artist' constituted the 'one bright spot in a mechanistic age ' (2009b, 223) . This suggests that Beckett's attribution of 'humanism' to McGreevy may not exactly be a note of praise.
After the Second World War, Beckett had still harsher words to say about the 'human'. In an essay on the paintings of Bram and Geer van Velde, published in Cahiers d'art in 1945, Beckett says that 'l'"humain"' is 'un vocable, et sans doute un concept aussi, qu'on reserve pour les temps des grands massacres,' 'un mot qu'on se renvoie aujourd'hui avec une fureur jamais égalée' [a term, and no doubt a concept as well, which is reserved for times of great massacres; a word that returns today with an unparalleled anger] (1984, 131, my translation humanism remained -by instinct and training Francis was, himself, a humanist -but now it was a Christianised humanism and all the more humane for accepting the implications of the Kingdom of God that is within every human being. (1943, 2) The poem 'Arrangement in Gray and Black', included in Poems, is dedicated 'To the memory of a student of François de Sales' (McGreevy, 1934, 55) , and it is possible that McGreevy may have spoken to Beckett about the saint and his humanist associations during the 1930s. Then again, McGreevy's Catholicism may have put a limit on his humanism: in his book on Eliot, he praises St Francis -although whether of Sales or of Assisi is not clear -for having 'laughed and not ironically' at the human condition: 'He got rid of his human respect, and was not afraid of making a fool of himself ' (1931, 25) .
From this evidence, it would seem that Beckett's attribution of 'humanism' to his friend's poetry was faint praise at best. But even if he found aspects of the 'human' problematic, and was unlikely to sign up to a Christian humanism, Beckett may have found a variety of humanism more to his liking. In The History of Philosophy, the major source for Beckett's autodidactic explorations of western thought during the 1930s, Wilhelm Windelband notes how Renaissance humanism 'reawakened older doctrines of Greek cosmology', which included thinkers to whom Beckett was sympathetic such as Democritus, Epicurus, the Stoics and the Sceptics (1901, 353) . Renaissance humanism informed the work of the English writer Robert Burton, whose explicitly Democritean book The Anatomy of Melancholy is frequently excerpted in Beckett's Dream and Whoroscope notebooks (Pilling, 1999 ; UoR MS3000, 84r-85v). Windelband also discusses the Renaissance rediscovery of scepticism, by thinkers such as Sanchez and Montaigne, which instigated fresh doubts about the reliability of the senses: 'Hence [the] empiricism of the Humanists now also threw itself more upon inner perception, which was universally regarded as much surer than outer perception ' (1901, 376) . Given Beckett's interest in 'self-awareness' (1984, 71) ' (1901, 376) .
Already this 'inner perception' is starting to sound like something far more compatible with the silent, contemplative prayer of quietism. Beckett used the term 'quietism' a number of times in his correspondence and reviews from the 1930s. He connects the quietist disposition with passages in Thomas Mann's Buddenbrooks (Letter to A.J. Leventhal, 7 May 1934 , qtd in Nixon, 2011 and in Proust's À la recherche du temps perdu ('Proust in Pieces'; 1984, 65) Nixon, 2011, 55) .
In a narrow historical sense, Quietism refers to a loose group of Catholic mystics in the seventeenth century, the most important being Miguel de Molinos (1628-1697), Madame Guyon (1648-1717) and François Fénelon (1651-1715). They all taught an approach to prayer that emphasised silence, passivity, resignation of the will, and the cultivation of 'holy indifference'. In the prayer of quiet, a Christian was supposed to put aside all forms of mental imagery, spiritual striving, rational thought, and devotional exercises such as praying the rosary (Evans, 2009; Choudhury, 2009 (Pilling, 1999, 97-102 Beckett thought his poetry 'was in one direction and was relatively colourless; that it drove towards a vacant, nameless consciousness ' (1995, 115) . But it is not immediately clear that Beckett thought that this exploration of consciousness was a bad thing. In the Dream notebook he records a phrase which seems to be of his own coinage: 'plung[e] à la Amiel into the Encyclopaedia of my subject' (Pilling, 1999, 132) . Rather than being colourless and dull, the inner world of the aspiring Amiel might be as rich and fascinating as an encyclopaedia (Beckett was [the head is silent] and 'il n'y a rien à pleurer' [there is nothing to lament] (Beckett, 2012, 115, my translation) . Ackerley is surely right to say that this poem is both 'a celebration of the realm of the mind and a grumble against the lack of time to explore it fully ' (2000, 89) . We cannot, therefore, unambiguously assume that Beckett is being critical of McGreevy when he describes his poetry as inward or even solipsistic.
It was, after all, the 'Celtic drill of extraversion' that Beckett really despised in poetry (1984, 73) .
Kennedy may yet have a point, however. Beckett certainly seems to be more critical of McGreevy in this passage:
To the mind that has raised itself to the grace of humility 'founded' -to quote from Mr McGreevy's T. S. Eliot -'not on misanthropy but on hope', prayer is no more (no less) than an act of recognition. A nod, even a wink. ... This is the adult mode of prayer syntonic to Mr McGreevy, the unfailing salute to his significant from which the fire is struck and the poem kindled (1984, 68; to Rilke since he 'is operating on the basis that prayer, wheresoever it may be directed, is always orientated outwards ' (2004, 118) . While I disagree that Beckett casts McGreevy's prayer as outwardly directed, it must be the case that McGreevy is deemed not to be prey to the kind of deluded self-absorption as Rilke.
In the book T.S. Eliot: A study, which Beckett quotes, McGreevy claims that a degree of inner separation is actually necessary for the Christian life:
The idea of our being, each one of us, in a prison, isolated from the rest, Mr.
Eliot substantiates with a dull passage from F. H. Bradley's Appearance and Reality. I think it was St. Augustine who expressed it most perfectly, at any rate most succinctly: 'The soul of another is dark.' The darkness, incidentally, is only the defect of a quality. For it is our isolation from each other that is our Beckett, however, was both attracted to and wary of inwardness: no doubt because, like Rilke, he was an apostate, and therefore more liable to turn inwardness into a dangerous solipsism than one who 'always had Jesus for his darling' (Beckett, 2009b, 257) . At times, he is drawn to it, as in the letter in which he approvingly discusses the 'deanthropomorphizations of the artist':
Even the portrait is beginning to be dehumanised as the individual feels himself (Beckett, 2009b, 258) . Beckett explains that because of his lack of religious belief, he was forced to make a 'substitution of terms' and replace Thomas à Kempis's references to God with his 'own feathers and entrails' (257). Consequently he found himself delving into self, instead of seeking communion with the deity. The result was an 'abject self-referring quietism', 'isolationism' and a 'crescendo of disparagement of others & myself ' (257-8) . This, he adds, was what led him to seek out psychotherapy in 1933. It would seem that one of Beckett's withering comments about Rilke applies just as much to himself: in his writing there is 'the overstatement of the solitude which he cannot make his element ' (1984, 66) . Most importantly, there is a sense in the letter that Beckett feels his own incurable lack of religious belief to be an obstacle or a hindrance in his search for solace.
Kennedy also argues that Beckett took issue with McGreevy's belief in the virtue of humility. He points out that the quote from McGreevy's Eliot book -'humility ... founded not on misanthropy but on hope' -comes from a passage in which Protestantism is roundly criticised: even in [Eliot's] early poems there were traces of a capacity for self-criticism, for humility, that penitential Catholic virtue, founded not on misanthropy but on hope, that is so utterly alien to the puritanical mind. (McGreevy, 1931, 16) In quoting this passage, Kennedy argues, Beckett 'takes a subtle swipe at the sectarian discriminations on which McGreevy's aesthetic is based ' (2005, 277) . According to Gide himself stresses Dostoevsky's vehement dislike of the Catholic Church and says that humility is so embedded in the Russian psyche that it can be found even among souls who lack the Christian faith (Gide, 1923, 226, 15) . So despite the arguments of Kennedy -and indeed McGreevy -humility need not be incompatible with Protestantism or even atheism, nor is humility something which Beckett necessarily scorns. In fact, he seems to have appreciated the way in which humility leads Gide to a 'quality of inconclusiveness' and 'integrity of incoherence ' (TCD MIC60, 43, 37) .
Precisely what Kennedy sees as a replacement for humility -integrity -appears in
Beckett's lecture as a product of it.
Two years after writing 'Humanistic Quietism', Beckett would find himself fascinated, 'without knowing why exactly' (Letter to Thomas McGreevy, 5 March 1936; Beckett, 2009b, 319) , by yet another low church advocate of humility: Arnold In the opaque final paragraph of 'Humanistic Quietism', Beckett explains how humility and self-awareness work might work together:
To know so well what one values is, what one's value is, as not to neglect those occasions (they are few) on which it may be doubled, is not a common faculty;
to retain in the acknowledgement of such enrichment the light, calm and finality that composed it is an extremely rare one.
What Beckett seems to be advocating here is self-knowledge that is as free from narcissism as it is from self-loathing. He wants the poet to be sufficiently aware of his or her own worth and priorities, while still being able to see where both these things might be enhanced ('doubled'). And then, once the enhancement ('enrichment') of the poet's worth and priorities has taken place, the poet should still retain his or her initial quasi-quietistic composure of 'light, calm and finality', and not be overthrown by Minute, or any of the other collects for the day, in so far as the reader feels it to have been the only way out of the tongue-tied profanity.
Beckett's distinction between a true prayer/poem and the 'collects for the day' echoes his insistence to Nuala Costello earlier in the year that one of his own poems was 'a prayer and not a collect ' (2009b, 188) . The daily collect is a short, structured prayer said during services in the Anglican and Catholic churches. Beckett seems to be objecting both to the collects' ritualistic recitation -whereas true prayer is a spontaneous utterance of last resort, the 'only way out' -and to their social nature.
One of Beckett's anti-poetic collects, the Meistergesang, refers to an inherently social poetic movement from the middle ages. Beckett probably discovered the term in J. G. (Lang, 1999, 115 Beckett then explains that a 'prayer may be "good" in Dante's sense on any note between and inclusive of the publican's whinge and the pharisee's tarantara'. The second half of the sentence is clear enough, since it refers to the parable told by Jesus (Luke 18:9-14) about two men who enter the temple to pray. While the Pharisee gives thanks that he is holier than others, the publican (tax collector) asks God for mercy.
Jesus says the publican is more justified in the eyes of the Lord, and warns: 'every one that exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted'.
Mary Bryden suggests Beckett is making a 'contrast between inner and outer, between insecurity and bold certainty' and that although 'both tendencies … may be productive of competent poetry', a 'middle ground between abasement and posturing' is to be preferred (1998, (11) (12) , which would fit with my conclusions from the previous section. Belacqua's 'embryonal repose', he hopes that 'no godly chandler would shorten his time with a good prayer' (Beckett, 2009a, 51) . A prayer that is '"good" in Dante's sense' might, then, mean a prayer in which a proud person humbles himself in the aim of furthering his own moral standing in the eyes of God and progressing towards paradise. Translated from Dante's theological framework into Beckett's aesthetic one, this would refer to the way a poet seeks 'enrichment' through humility and selfknowledge, as I argued in the previous section. But neat as this reading might be, it is difficult to reconcile this with the fact that Beckett says that this 'good' prayer can be found 'between and inclusive of' the two extremes of the whinging publican and the proud pharisee, rather than simply between them.
Conclusion
The apparent oxymoron of the title 'Humanistic Quietism' is, in the end, apposite for a piece of writing which is so concerned about what lies 'between' extremes and which reflects so many of Beckett's own inner conflicts, both artistic and personal, from this period. The 'poison and antidote' that the narrator of The Unnamable finds in religion applies just as well to the constituent concepts of this review: prayer, humanism, quietism, self-awareness, and humility can all threaten creativity just as easily as they can enrich it. The pitfalls are -respectively -ritualism, hubris, abjection, solipsism, and self-loathing, while the potential fruits of these attitudes are spontaneity, radical interior empiricism, inner calm, honesty, and artistic integrity. In treading so narrow a path through this difficult conceptual territory, it is perhaps understandable that Beckett occasionally contradicts himself, as my analysis of
Dante's 'good' prayer would suggest he did. As in 'Dante … Bruno . Vico .. Joyce', Beckett seems to have resisted the temptation to 'make a really tidy job of it', preferring the 'coincidence of contraries' in his 'handful of abstractions' (Beckett, 1984, 19) . And even though I have courted the danger of the 'neatness of identifications', this essay cannot pretend to have brought brilliance to all of the murk in 'Humanistic Quietism'. There remain many, not few, occasions for further 'enrichment'.
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